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In Japan, between the end of December 2003 and March 2004, four outbreaks of acute, highly transmissible and lethal disease occurred in
birds in three prefectures separated by 150–450 km, involving three chicken farms and a group of chickens raised as pets. The cause of each
outbreak was an H5N1 influenza A virus—the first highly pathogenic virus to be isolated from the outbreaks in Japan since 1925. The H5N1
virus was also isolated from dead crows, apparently infected by contact with virus-contaminated material. These H5N1 viruses were
antigenically similar to each other, but could be differentiated from other H5 viruses, including those isolated from Hong Kong in 1997 and
2003, by use of a panel of monoclonal antibodies in hemagglutination inhibition assays. Genetically, the H5N1 viruses in Japan were closely
related to each other in all genes and were genetically closely related to a single isolate of genotype V that was isolated in 2003 in the
Guandong Province of mainland China (A/chicken/Shantou/4231/2003). The virulence of the index isolate (A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004)
was studied in chickens and mice. Chickens intravenously or intranasally inoculated with the isolate died within 1 or 3 days of inoculation,
respectively. In mice, although this virus replicated well in the lung without prior adaptation and spread to the brain, the dose lethal to 50% of
the mice was 5  105 50% egg infectious doses (EID50), which is less pathogenic than the Hong Kong 1997 H5N1 viruses isolated from
humans. Our findings indicate that the H5N1 viruses associated with the influenza outbreaks in chickens in Japan were genotypically closely
related to an H5N1 virus isolated from chicken in China in 2003 (genotype V), but were different from those prevalent in southeastern Asia in
2003–2004 (i.e., genotype Z) and that these highly pathogenic viruses can be transmitted to crows, which are highly susceptible to these
viruses.
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Highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses attracted
international attention when they were transmitted to 18
humans in Hong Kong in 1997, resulting in six deaths.
(Claas et al., 1998; Subbarao et al., 1998). The virus
continued to circulate in Asia and, in 2003, two more
people in Hong Kong were infected, leading to one
additional fatality (Peiris et al., 2004). The viruses
responsible for these human cases originate from the
H5N1 viruses circulating among birds in southern China.
In fact, the HAs of these H5N1 viruses can be traced back
to a virus isolated from a goose in southern China in 1996
[A/goose/Guandong/1/96 (Go/GD; H5N1)], and H5N1
viruses of multiple genotypes have been circulating in this
part of the world since that time (Guan et al., 2002a; Sims
et al., 2003; Webster et al., 2002). The NA of the virus
responsible for the 1997 Hong Kong outbreak was derived
from an N1 virus distinct from the Go/GD-like virus.
Viruses of this genotype (i.e., those isolated from humans
in Hong Kong in 1997) have since disappeared. Although
H5N1 viruses emerged in land-based poultry in the
markets of Hong Kong after 1997, immense depopulation
of poultry in that country (Guan et al., 2002b) quelled the
outbreaks before the virus became widely disseminated.
These H5N1 viruses were not only highly pathogenic to
chickens and quail, but they were also lethal to mice
without adaptation (although a high virus inoculum is
required). Accordingly, the H5N1 avian influenza viruses
continue to be a threat to public health.
Since late 2003, highly pathogenic H5N1 viruses have
continued to cause outbreaks in Asian countries, including
Vietnam, Korea, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Indonesia, and
China. Some of these viruses have been transmitted to
humans, e.g., in Vietnam and Thailand (Hien et al., 2004;
World Health Organization, 2004a), resulting in over 30
documented deaths (World Health Organization, 2004d).
Although most of these countries declared themselves to be
free of avian influenza in the spring of 2004 (World Health
Organization, 2004b), these viruses appear to have returned
to at least some of these countries (World Health Organ-
ization, 2004c).
From the end of December 2003 to March 2004,
outbreaks of acute, highly transmissible and lethal disease
in chickens occurred in Japan, involving three chicken farms
and a group of chickens raised as pets. Here, we
characterized the highly pathogenic H5N1 influenza viruses
isolated from these outbreaks.Results
Outbreak information
In late December 2003, layer chickens began to die in
one of the seven chicken houses on a farm in theYamaguchi prefecture located in the western part of
Japan (Fig. 1). Infection spread throughout the other
chicken houses, resulting in the loss of a total of 34,000
chickens to either infection or to slaughtering in an effort
to control the outbreak. Homogenates of organs (such as
trachea, lung, spleen, kidney, and rectum) from the
infected birds were inoculated into the allantoic cavity
of 10-day-old embryonated chicken eggs. Hemagglutinat-
ing agents were isolated from all the organs tested. We
further evaluated the hemagglutinating agent isolated
from the spleen, and it was identified to be an influenza
A virus of H5N1 subtype (A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004)
by conventional hemagglutination inhibition (HI) and
neuraminidase inhibition (NI) assays. The second out-
break occurred in February 2004 in a flock of 13
chickens raised as pets in the Oita prefecture, which is
located 150 km from the site of the first outbreak. The
sudden death of seven of these chickens led to the
slaughter of the remaining six chickens as well as one
duck. H5N1 viruses were isolated from the lungs,
tracheas, and spleens of these chickens and one of the
isolates from spleen, A/chicken/Oita/8/2004, was used in
this study. The third outbreak also occurred in February
2004, but 350–450 km away from the Yamaguchi and
Oita prefectures in a commercial layer chicken farm in
the Kyoto prefecture. This outbreak resulted in the loss
of 225,000 chickens; the trachea from one of which was
the source of another H5N1 virus isolate (A/chicken/
Kyoto/3/2004). The fourth outbreak also occurred in
March 2004 in a commercial broiler chicken farm in the
Kyoto prefecture, and involved the loss of 15,000
chickens. Following the third outbreak, H5N1 viruses
were also isolated from a total of nine crows found dead
within a 30-km radius of the farm in Kyoto. A/crow/
Kyoto/53/2004 and A/crow/Osaka/102/2004 were isolated
from trachea samples and chosen as representative
isolates for subsequent studies.
Antigenic characterization
Some antigenic differences were detected among the
H5N1 viruses isolated in Japan; two isolates from the
third outbreak (A/chicken/Kyoto/3/2004 and A/crow/
Kyoto/53/2004) failed to react with monoclonal antibody
77B1, whereas the other isolates were reactive (Table 1).
These Japanese H5N1 isolates were also antigenically
different from other previously characterized H5N1
viruses, including those isolated in Hong Kong in 1997
and 2003 (see reactivity with monoclonal antibodies 94F1
and 17C5), leaving the origin of these Japanese H5N1
isolates unclear.
Phylogenetic analysis
To determine whether the H5N1 strains isolated in
Japan are related to those circulating in Asia since 1996,
Fig. 1. The location of the Japanese prefectures in which H5N1 highly pathogenic avian influenza outbreaks occurred.
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sequenced. All of the Japanese H5N1 isolates were
genetically closely related to one another (N99% identity
at the nucleotide level in all eight RNA segments; see
Table 2), suggesting that these isolates share an immediate
ancestor. All of the genes of these Japanese H5N1 isolates
showed more than 98% nucleotide identity with that of the
H5N1 virus isolated from a chicken in China in 2003 (A/
chicken/Shantou/4231/2003, genotype V) (see Table 3; the
result with the index A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004 strain
only is shown).
The phylogenetic analysis for these genes reinforced the
above-mentioned findings, leading us to conclude that the
Japanese H5N1 isolates belong to the same genetic cluster
as A/chicken/Shantou/4231/2003 (Fig. 2). These results
further suggest that H5N1 viruses of distinct genotypes
were circulating in late 2003–early 2004; that is, genotype
Z in Indonesia, Thailand, Vietnam, (Li et al., 2004), and
genotype V in Japan (this study).
Molecular markers
As is typical of all H5N1 viruses isolated since 1997, all
of the Japanese isolates contained multiple basic amino
acids at the HA cleavage site (Table 4). However, the
precise amino acid sequences at this site were not identical
among these isolates; the Japanese isolates had a single
amino acid deletion at this site, as is the case for A/duck/
China/E319-2/2003 and A/duck/Hong Kong/573.4/2001(Guan et al., 2002b). Of interest, there was divergence even
among the Japanese isolates; the Oita isolate differed from
other viruses at this site. The biologic significance of this
difference remains unknown.
When the NAs of the Japanese isolates were aligned
with that of other H5 viruses, the Japanese isolates had a
20 amino acid deletion (positions at 49–68) identical to
that found in isolates of the genotypes V and Z (Li et al.,
2004).
The presence of specific amino acids in two other gene
products are known to affect the virulence of these viruses:
glutamic acid-to-lysine mutation at position 627 in PB2 is
associated with high virulence in mice in the 1997 Hong
Kong viruses (Hatta et al., 2001) and glutamic acid at
position 92 in NS1 is associated with high virulence in pigs
upon reassortment of the NS gene of H5N1 with A/Puerto
Rico/8/34 (Seo et al., 2002). All of the Japanese isolates had
glutamic acid at position 627 in PB2 and glutamic acid at
position 92 in NS1.
There are two types of antiviral compounds for influenza
A viruses: M2 ion channel blockers, such as amantadine and
rimantadine, and NA inhibitors, such as oseltamivir and
zanamivir (Monto, 2003). Resistance to these compounds is
associated with particular mutations. Viruses become
resistant to amantadine through a single amino acid
substitution at position 26, 27, 30, 31, or 34 in the
transmembrane region of the M2 protein (Crumpacker,
2001); viruses become resistant to oseltamivir through a
single amino acid substitution at position 119, 152, 274, or
Table 1
Antigenic analysis of H5N1 influenza viruses isolated in Japan in 2004
Viruses HI titers with the following: Reference
Polyclonal antiserum
to Tern/South Africa/61
(hyperimmune)
Polyclonal antiserum
to Ty/Ontario/7732/66
(hyperimmune)
Monoclonal antibodies to
HK/156/97
Monoclonal antibodies
to HK/486/97
Monoclonal antibodies
to Ty/Ontario/7732/66
31G1 61B2 62H7 94F1 14F8 17C5 24B9 77B1
A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004
(H5N1)
800 100 800 3200 800 100 200 b100 b100 1600 This study
A/chicken/Oita/8/2004
(H5N1)
800 100 100 400 200 100 b100 b100 b100 400 This study
A/chicken/Kyoto/3/2004
(H5N1)
800 100 100 400 100 b100 b100 b100 b100 b100 This study
A/crow/Kyoto/53/2004
(H5N1)
800 100 400 200 100 b100 b100 b100 b100 b100 This study
A/crow/Osaka/102/2004
(H5N1)
400 100 200 200 100 b100 b100 b100 b100 400 This study
A/tern/South Africa/61
(H5N3)
6400 200 800 800 400 400 b100 400 b100 b100 Becker (1966)
A/swan/Shimane/499/83
(H5N3)
1600 200 800 400 b100 200 b100 200 400 400 Ito et al. (2001)
A/duck/Hokkaido/67/96
(H5N4)
1600 200 100 b100 b100 400 b100 1600 b100 200 Takada et al. (1999)
A/Hong Kong/156/97
(H5N1)
1600 200 1600 3200 1600 800 200 3200 b100 800 Gao et al. (1999)
A/Hong Kong/483/97
(H5N1)
800 200 200 400 400 400 b100 800 b100 b100 Gao et al. (1999)
A/Hong Kong/213/2003
(H5N1)
3200 800 b100 800 200 800 b100 6400 100 12800 Guan et al. (2004)
A/turkey/Ontario/7732/66
(H5N9)
400 1600 b100 b100 b100 b100 b100 b100 800 6400 Lang et al. (1968)
Note. Polyclonal and monoclonal antibodies were used at a starting dilution of 1:100.
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Table 2
Nucleotide and amino acid differences among Japanese H5N1 influenza viruses
Segment No. of nucleotides compared No. of nucleotide (amino acid) differences between the index A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004 strain and:
A/chicken/Oita/8/2004 A/chicken/Kyoto/3/2004 A/crow/Kyoto/53/2004 A/crow/Osaka/102/2004
PB2 2280 5 (0) 5 (1; I463Va) 6 (1; I463V) 8 (2; T339M, G698S)
PB1 2274 7 (2; C80S, F94Y) 1 (1; C80S) 1 (1; C80S) 1 (1; C80S)
PA 2151 4 (2; G66D, V596I) 7 (1; V596I) 7 (1; V596I) 7 (2; E352D, V596I)
HA 1704 9 (4; A83V, I219V,
R325K, S503N)
7 (2; K152T, I219V) 6 (2; K152T, I219V) 5 (2; S123P, I219V)
NP 1497 1 (0) 1 (0) 1 (0) 2 (0)
NA 1350 7 (1; Q45K) 7 (1; N289D) 8 (2; P252S, N289D) 10 (2; V129A, I294M)
M 982 0 (M1, 0) 1 (M1, 0) 1 (M1, 0) 1 (M1, 0)
(M2, 0) (M2, 0) (M2, 0) (M2, 0)
NS 823 3 (NS1, 1; L3P) 3 (NS1, 2; L3P, S73P) 4 (NS1, 2; L3P, S73P) 2 (NS1, 1; L3P)
(NS2, 2; L3P, A90T) (NS2, 2; L3P, A90T) (NS2, 2; L3P, A90T) (NS2, 2; L3P, A90T)
a The amino acid differences found between A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004 and others are shown as follows: amino acid residue found in A/chicken/
Yamaguchi/7/2004, amino acid position, and amino acid residue found in the virus in question.
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Japanese isolates do not contain the amino acid residues in
these proteins that would confer to them resistance to these
antiviral compounds.
Pathogenecity
Pathogenicity testing, according to the guidelines estab-
lished by the Office International Epizootics (OIE), showed
Japanese H5N1 isolates to be highly pathogenic for
chickens, given that all chickens died within a day of being
intravenously inoculated with one of these viruses (A/crow/
Osaka/102/2004 was not tested). Upon intranasal inocula-
tion of 6-week-old specific pathogen-free chickens (n = 8)
with 106 50% egg infectious doses (EID50) of the A/
chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004 virus, each chicken died within
3 days.
To test the virulence of A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004 in
mammalian species, we determined the virus dose that
would be lethal to 50% of mice exposed. This dose was 5 
105 EID50, indicating that this strain is not as virulent as
some of the H5N1 viruses isolated from humans (Gao
et al., 1999), but is as virulent as most H5N1 viruses
isolated from poultry (Lipatov et al., 2003). Although a
high dose of virus was required to kill mice, this strain
clearly has the ability to replicate well in mouse lung
without prior adaptation and to spread to the brain. Its
ability to spread to internal organs, however, was limited
(Table 5).
Sensitivity to an NA inhibitor
NA inhibitors are thought to play an important role in
controlling annual influenza epidemics, as well as pandem-
ics caused by new influenza strains. One such inhibitor,
oseltamivir, was used to limit infection among people
involved in the effort to contain the avian influenza
outbreaks in Japan. For this reason, we tested the sensitivity
of one of the Japanese isolates to oseltamivir. The amount ofvirus required to inhibit 50% of the activity (IC50) of
oseltamivir carboxylate was 3.4 nM for A/chicken/Yama-
guchi/7/2004, which is within the IC50 range for influenza
viruses deemed sensitive to this drug (i.e., 1–10 nM;
Gubareva et al., 2002). This finding thus validates the
prophylactic use of oseltamivir during the eradication and
containment effort.Discussion
Here, we have shown that H5N1 influenza A viruses
isolated in Japan between late 2003 and 2004 were
closely related to each other. Pathogenic avian influenza
viruses can emerge from repeated passages of non- or
low-pathogenic viruses in poultry (Ito et al., 2001).
However, we are unaware of any recent influenza cases
caused by such viruses in poultry in Japan. Therefore,
the emergence of these Japanese H5N1 viruses likely
stems from either a single source that subsequently
spread within the country or from multiple sources
where viruses highly related to the Japanese isolates
were circulating.
Recent outbreaks of H5N1 avian influenza in south-
eastern Asia were thought to have been caused by viruses of
genotype Z (Li et al., 2004). This genotype emerged in
2002, and has become a dominant H5N1 virus in southern
China (Guan et al., 2004; Li et al., 2004). Our genetic
analysis showed that the Japanese H5N1 isolates clustered
with a single genotype V virus isolated in Shantou, in the
Guandong province of mainland China. However, because
there is limited information regarding the viruses currently
circulating in Asia, we were unable to pinpoint the exact
origin of the Japanese isolates, which would be valuable for
the prevention of future influenza outbreaks in Japanese
poultry.
Of interest, the Japanese H5N1 viruses were isolated
from dead crows. A large number of crows were
observed near the chicken houses on the farms in Kyoto,
M. Mase et al. / Virology 332 (2005) 167–176172suggesting that these crows were infected with the virus
by direct contact with virus-contaminated material. Since
crow deaths were not observed prior to chicken deaths
and chickens did not have direct contact with crows, it is
unlikely that chickens were infected from crows.
Although many other species of dead birds, including
dove, bulbul, thrush, and sparrow (as identified in a study
by the Kyoto prefecture), were tested for virus during this
period, none harbored the virus. The possibility exists,
however, that there are avian species that harbor the virus
without showing disease symptoms. Thus, crows may be
exceptionally sensitive to these H5N1 viruses, although
morbidity and mortality rates remain unknown. Given
that the last virus-positive crow was found 1 month after
the clean up of the farm in Kyoto, it is possible that the
virus may have spread among crows. However, because
no new viruses have been isolated for more than 2
months since the last virus isolation from a crow, it is
likely that this virus is no longer circulating in birds in
Japan.
How were these viruses introduced into Japan? Several
possibilities exist: feral birds, virus-contaminated material,Fig. 2. Phylogenetic trees of the H5 HA (a), N1 NA (b), PA (c) genes of influenza A
bases) of the N1 NAs, and 1435–2172 (738 bases) of the PA genes were used for p
number of nucleotide differences required to join nodes and sequences. Viruses
confidence levels of bootstrap analysis with 1,000 replications as a percentage va
fowl), Gs (goose), HK (Hong Kong), Hokk (Hokkaido), Ph (pheasant), PR (Puerand illegally imported infected birds are all possible
sources. The exact source of the Japanese influenza
outbreaks is unlikely to be found given the low likelihood
of isolating virus-positive samples from any of these
potential sources.
The H5N1 Japanese isolates were highly pathogenic for
chickens, killing every exposed chicken within a day of
intravenously injection. Many of the virus-inoculated
chickens died suddenly without clinical signs and presented
no apparent gross regions on postmortem examination.
Indeed, this was also the case in the field. It is therefore
important for veterinarians to recognize that these highly
pathogenic avian influenza viruses may not cause classic
signs and symptoms in their host, such as extensive
hemorrhage.
The index Japanese H5N1 virus was lethal to mice
without prior adaptation, replicating in the brain, lung, and
spleen. The pathogenicity of this virus was thus similar to
that reported by Lipatov et al. (2003). Fortunately, there
were no human cases reported during the outbreaks in
Japan; however, these viruses clearly have the potential to
infect mammals and cause severe illness, as has beenviruses. Nucleotides 62–1564 (1503 bases) of the H5 HAs, 510–1061 (552
hylogenetic analysis. Horizontal distances are proportional to the minimum
isolated in Japan are underlined in italic. Numbers at the nodes indicate
lue. Abbreviations: Ck (chicken), Dk (duck), GD (Guandong), Gf (guinea
to Rico), Sck (silkey chicken), TW (Taiwan), Ty (turkey).
Fig. 2 (continued).
M. Mase et al. / Virology 332 (2005) 167–176 173recently demonstrated in Thailand and Vietnam (Hien et al.,
2004; World Health Organization, 2004b). One possible
explanation for the lack of human infection in Japan may be
the prophylactic use of oseltamivir by the personnel
involved in the effort to contain and eradicate the H5N1
virus, which we have shown to be sensitive to this drug.
Alternatively, infectivity to humans might differ between the
viruses of genotype Z that were responsible for human
deaths in Thailand and Vietnam and those of genotype V
isolated in Japan. Considering that H5N1 viruses have been
circulating in Asia since 1996, they will no doubt remain in
this part of the world and will likely be transmitted to other
countries. It is, therefore, essential that we continue to be
vigilant and prepare for future outbreaks by, for example,
stockpiling anti-influenza drugs and vaccines recently
produced with new technology, such as reverse genetics
(Neumann et al., 1999; World Health Organization, 2004e).Materials and methods
Virus isolation and identification
Tissue homogenates (i.e., trachea, lung, spleen, kidney,
and rectum) from infected birds were inoculated into theallantoic cavity of 10-day-old embryonated eggs. Inoculated
eggs were incubated at 37 8C for 1–2 days. The subtypes of
the isolates were determined by conventional hemaggluti-
nation inhibition (HI) and neuramidase inhibition (NI)
assays.
Virus stocks
To prepare stocks for this study, viruses were propagated
in the allantoic cavity of embryonated eggs once at 37 8C
for 1–2 days and then stored at 80 8C until use.
Genetic and phylogenetic analyses
To determine the genetic relationship between these
isolates and other viruses, all eight genes of the isolates were
sequenced. Viral RNA was extracted from virus-containing
allantoic fluid by using a commercial kit (ISOGEN-LS,
Nippongene, Tokyo, Japan). After reverse transcription with
Superscript II (Life Technologies, Gaithersburg, MD) using
random 9-mers, cDNAs were amplified by the polymerase
chain reaction (PCR). PCR amplification of the coding
regions of the viral gene segments was performed with
gene-specific primer sets (the sequences of the primers are
available upon request). PCR-derived dsDNAwas used as a
Fig. 2 (continued).
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automated DNA sequencer using cycle sequencing dye
terminator chemistry (Perkin-Elmer/Applied Biosystems,
Foster City, CA). The nucleotide sequences were analyzed
using version 12.0 of the sequence analysis software
package GENETYX-MAC (Software Development, Tokyo,
Japan). The phylogenetic trees were constructed, as
described previously. (Mase et al., 2001).
The nucleotide sequences obtained from this study
are available from GenBank under accession numbers
AB166859–AB166866, AB188813–AB188824, and
AB189046–AB189065.Table 3
Sequence comparison between A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004 and other recent H5
Segment Percent nucleotide (amino acid) homology with A/chicken/Yama
A/chicken/Shantou/4231/2003 (genotype V) A/goose/Tha
PB2 99.2 (98.9) 98.9 (99.6)
PB1 99.3 (99.6) 98.5 (99.3)
PA 99.6 (99.2) 93.6 (97.9)
HA 98.5 (98.1) 97.2 (97.0)
NP 99.5 (99.1) 98.7 (100)
NA 98.8 (98.4) 97.3 (96.4)
M 99.4 (M1 99.6) (M2 100) 98.8 (M1 99
NS 99.3 (NS1 97.8) (NS2 96.7) 98.2 (NS1 9Antigenic analysis
The antigenic relationships among H5N1 influenza
viruses were determined in hemagglutination inhibition
(HI) tests by using polyclonal chicken antiserum and a
panel of monoclonal antibodies (Horimoto et al., 2004).
Pathogenecity tests
Chickens
Six-week-old specific pathogen-free chickens were used
in this study. Eight chickens were inoculated either intra-N1 influenza viruses
guchi/7/2004
iland/79/2004 (genotype Z) A/HongKong/212/2003 (genotype Z+)
98.9 (99.3)
99.1 (99.6)
93.8 (97.8)
97.3 (97.3)
99.1 (99.8)
89.8 (92.1)
.6) (M2 96.9) 98.9 (M1 100) (M2 96.9)
7.3) (NS2 98.3) 98.5 (NS1 98.2) (NS2 97.5)
Table 4
HA connecting peptide sequences of recent Asian H5N1 viruses
Viruses Connecting peptide amino acid sequence Reference
A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004 R E – R R K K R This study
A/chicken/Oita/8/2004 R E – K R K K R This study
A/chicken/Kyoto/3/2004 R E – R R K K R This study
A/crow/Kyoto/53/2004 R E – R R K K R This study
A/crow/Osaka/102/2004 R E – R R K K R This study
A/HongKong/156/97 R E R R R K K R Subbarao et al. (1998)
A/chicken/Hong Kong/YU822.2/2001 R E R R R K K R Guan et al. (2002b)
A/chicken/Hong Kong/YU562/2001 R E R R R K K R Guan et al. (2002b)
A/pheasant/Hong Kong/FY155/2001 R E R R R K K R Guan et al. (2002b)
A/chicken/Hong Kong/FY150/2001 R E R R R K K R Guan et al. (2002b)
A/chicken/Hong Kong/NT873.3/2001 R E I R R K K R Guan et al. (2002b)
A/duck/Hong Kong/573.4/2001 R E – R R K K R Guan et al. (2002b)
A/duck/AVL-1/Anyang/2001 R E R R R K K R Tumpey et al. (2002)
A/teal/China/2978.1/2001 R E I R R K K R Li et al. (2004)
A/pheasant/Hong Kong/sv674.15/2002 R E R R R K K R Guan et al. (2004)
A/chicken/Hong Kong/96.1/2002 R E R R R K K R Guan et al. (2004)
A/Hong Kong/213/2003 R E R R R K K R Guan et al. (2004)
A/duck/China/E319-2/2003 R E – R R R K R unpublished
A/chicken/Shantou/4231/2003 R E R R R K K R Li et al. (2004)
A/chicken/Indonesia/BL/2003 R E R R R K K R Li et al. (2004)
A/Vietnam/1196/2004 R E R R R K K R Li et al. (2004)
A/goose/Thailand/79/2004 R E R R R K K R Li et al. (2004)
M. Mase et al. / Virology 332 (2005) 167–176 175venously or intranasally with 0.1 ml of virus (106 EID50)
and observed daily for 14 days.
Mice
To determine the mouse lethal dose50 (MLD50,) 6-week-
old female BALB/c mice (n = 32; SLC Japan) were
anesthetized by pentobarbital inhalation. Mice were intra-
nasally infected in groups of four with 50 Al of allantoic
fluid in PBS (10-fold serial dilutions from 101 to 108
virus) and observed for 20 days. The organ tropism of the
virus was assessed by intranasally inoculating mice with 50
Al of virus (106 EID50). Three mice were then sacrificed on
day 3 and another three on day 6 postinfection so that viral
titers in their lung, brain, spleen, kidney, and liver could be
determined by inoculating tissue homogenates into the
allantoic cavity of 10-day-old embryonated eggs.
Oseltamivir carboxylate sensitivity
The sensitivity of the viral NA to oseltamivir carboxylate
was evaluated with an NA enzyme inhibition assay based onTable 5
Growth of A/chicken/Yamaguchi/7/2004 in mice
Organs Days after infection (log10 EID50/g)
a
3 6
Brain 0/3 2/3 (3.7 F 0.5)
Lung 3/3 (5.4 F 1.0) 3/3 (5.2 F 1.9)
Spleen 3/3 (4.3 F 1.0) 1/3 (3.3)
Liver 0/3 0/3
Kidney 0/3 0/3
a Virus titers in the organs shown were determined. Mean F SD for the
number of virus-positive mice that were sacrificed.the method of Gubareva et al. (2002). Methylumbelliferyl-
N-acetylneuraminic acid (MUNANA, Sigma), at a final
concentration of 0.1 mM, was used as a fluorescent
substrate. Virus dilutions containing between 800 and
1200 fluorescence units were used in the NA inhibition
assay. Briefly, diluted virus and drug (0.01 nM–1 mM) in 33
mM 2-[N-morpholino]ethanesulfonic acid (pH 6.0) contain-
ing 4 mM CaCl2 were mixed and incubated for 30 min at 37
8C, at which point, the substrate was added. After 1 h at 37
8C, the reaction was stopped by adding 0.1 M NaOH in 80%
ethanol (pH 10.0). Fluorescence was quantified at an
excitation wavelength of 360 nm and an emission wave-
length of 465 nm. The relationship between the concen-
tration of inhibitor and the percentage of fluorescence
inhibition was determined and IC50 values were obtained by
extrapolating those findings.Acknowledgments
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